In the public imagination, a coup d’état usually conjures images of tanks rolling through capital cities and soldiers storming presidential palaces.
But some of the most dangerous assaults on democracy do not come from outside the government — they come from within.
This quieter, more calculated seizure of power is known as an autogolpe, or self-coup.
In an era of global democratic backsliding, understanding how autogolpes unfold and why they succeed has never been more important.
What Is an Autogolpe?
An autogolpe (Spanish for “self-coup”) occurs when a leader who was legally elected or constitutionally installed suspends or dismantles other branches of government to consolidate power.
Unlike a traditional coup, where the military or insurgents overthrow the sitting government, a self-coup is initiated by the incumbent executive; a president or prime minister against their own constitutional system.
In practical terms, a self-coup may involve:
Dissolving parliament or congress
Suspending or rewriting the constitution
Taking control of the judiciary
Governing by decree
Restricting media and civil liberties
The leader often justifies these moves as necessary to overcome “gridlock,” fight corruption, respond to national emergencies, or restore order.
But the result is typically the erosion and sometimes destruction of democratic checks and balances.
Where Has It Happened?
Autogolpes have appeared across continents and political systems. While the term originated in Latin America, the phenomenon is global.
Peru (1992): The Defining Case
The most widely cited example occurred in Peru under President Alberto Fujimori.
On April 5, 1992, Fujimori dissolved Congress, suspended the constitution, and reorganised the judiciary with military backing.
Fujimori argued that political obstruction was preventing him from defeating insurgent groups and stabilising the economy.
Many Peruvians initially supported the move. A new constitution followed, and Fujimori extended his rule.
But the longer-term consequences were profound: weakened institutions, corruption scandals, human rights abuses, and years of political instability.
Decades later, Peru continues to struggle with fragile governance, a legacy many analysts trace back to that moment.
Guatemala (1993): A Failed Attempt
In 1993, President Jorge Serrano Elías attempted to dissolve Congress and suspend constitutional rights.
However, unlike in Peru, civil society, the judiciary, and elements of the military resisted.
Serrano fled the country, and constitutional order was restored.
This case demonstrates that autogolpes are not inevitable; strong institutional pushback can stop them.
Brazil (1937): Institutional Collapse
In 1937, Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas used a fabricated communist threat to dissolve Congress and impose a new authoritarian constitution, launching the “Estado Novo” regime.
The move centralised power dramatically and suppressed opposition, illustrating how fear whether genuine or manufactured often becomes the political fuel for a self-coup.
France (1851): A Historical Precedent
In 1851, President Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte dissolved the French National Assembly and later declared himself Emperor Napoleon III.
Though the term “autogolpe” did not exist then, historians widely recognise the episode as an early example of a self-coup.
How Common Are Self-Coups?
Political research indicates that self-coup attempts are less frequent than traditional coups, but they are far from rare.
Since World War II, dozens of attempts have occurred across Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Europe.
What makes them especially concerning is their comparatively higher success rate.
Unlike traditional coups which require outsiders to seize power and convince the military, police, and bureaucracy to defect; in self coup, a sitting leader already controls much of the state apparatus.
They can:
Use emergency powers as legal cover
Command loyalty from security forces
Influence state media
Exploit constitutional loopholes
Because of this built-in advantage, self-coups often face less immediate resistance than military uprisings.
Launching a Winning Autogolpe
Though anyone launching a coup must have some reason to believe they will succeed, according to political scientist John J. Chin, while about half of traditional coup attempts fail, four out of five attempted autogolpes succeed.
Why are autogolpes more successful than “regular” coups and what leads to their success?
Conditions prior to the launching of a self-coup play an important role.
Countries with a long history of democracy are less likely to fall victim to an autogolpe, while those that haven’t built up sufficient popular belief in the value of democracy over other forms of government may be more susceptible.
In Latin America, with a history of caudillismo, or strong-man rule, following independence from Spain, autocracy has a much longer tradition than democratic rule.
Military support is essential for a successful autogolpe; the leader must ensure that the country’s armed forces are loyal to him personally.
The implicit threat of repressive action against ousted officials or the civilian populace is necessary to ensure that the autogolpe proceeds apace.
The dangers of attempting an autogolpe without it can be seen in two recent failed self-coups: Peru in 2022 and South Korea in 2024.
Both presidents ended up in jail when military support for their power grabs failed to materialise, and they were instead held to account.
The leader’s ability to control the narrative surrounding his illegal actions is also paramount; a successful self-coup will usually see press freedoms being curtailed or national media being co-opted by the new regime.
Having an identifiable threat, like Fujimori with the Shining Path, may help to convince people, at least in the short term, that extraordinary measures must be taken.
However, over the long term, a return to the trappings of democracy is generally necessary to appease both internal and external observers.
The Challenges of Fighting Autogolpes
By nullifying the state apparatus that people have traditionally relied on to, however clumsily, represent their interests while simultaneously retaining power over the state’s military forces, the autogolpe leaves the citizenry few avenues to protest, let alone fight back.
People cannot appeal to legislators when there’s no legislature; lawsuits can not be brought to courts that no longer exist.
Further, with the regime silencing or taking over national media, comprehension of what is actually happening may be limited, decreasing the likelihood of mass movements like general strikes.
Even less inspiring, self-coup failures historically have largely been the result of the leaders themselves overestimating their support with the military or party elites, not because of anything the citizenry has done or is able to do to stop them.
There is some evidence that international pressure, as it does with traditional coups, can undermine self-coups specifically by causing the president’s internal support to dry up—if the military or his political supporters believe international action is imminent, they may flinch.
Political scientist Alexander Noyes argues that “international supporters of democracy must step up and provide more robust and consistent responses to executive coup attempts.”
Mass demonstrations may also put sufficient pressure on the president’s supporters but run the risk of being suppressed by the military.
The fact that nearly all of Peru’s living former presidents are currently in prison or under house arrest, at least three of them having attempted autogolpes, may serve as a cautionary tale—potential jail time does not always dissuade presidential shenanigans.
Overall, evidence suggests that “high media accuracy, low partisanship, and citizen support for democracy typically promote democratic survival,” and therefore are keys to both preventing and undermining autogolpes.
However, in a world of rising populism, these elements are increasingly absent.
What Can Be Done to Prevent an Autogolpe?
Stopping a self-coup requires preparation before a crisis emerges.
Strengthen Judicial Independence
Courts must have the authority — and courage — to declare executive overreach unconstitutional.
Protect Legislative Authority
Parliaments need procedural safeguards that prevent sudden dissolution without broad constitutional support.
Ensure Military Neutrality
Professional, apolitical armed forces reduce the risk of executive abuse.
Empower Civil Society
Independent unions, academic institutions, religious bodies, and watchdog groups can mobilise public resistance.
Safeguard Media Freedom
A free press informs citizens and exposes constitutional violations in real time.
Promote Constitutional Clarity
Ambiguous emergency powers are often exploited. Clear limits and sunset clauses can prevent misuse.
Prevention is always easier than restoration. Once democratic norms are broken, rebuilding trust can take generations.
Why This Matters to Ordinary Citizens
An autogolpe may seem like elite political maneuvering, but its effects reach everyday life.
If courts lose independence, legal disputes may no longer be fair.
When media is restricted, citizens lose access to reliable information.
Economic confidence drops, jobs and savings can suffer.
If civil liberties shrink, personal freedoms can disappear quietly.
Democracy is not only about elections.
It is about institutions that distribute power, protect minorities, and ensure accountability.
When those structures are dismantled, the consequences extend far beyond political offices.
A Warning for the 21st Century
Modern autogolpes are often more subtle than those of the past.
Instead of dramatic tank deployments, today’s power grabs may unfold through executive decrees, manipulated constitutional reforms, or extended emergency powers.
The danger lies precisely in their gradual nature. Democracies rarely collapse overnight. They erode step by step.
History shows that while some self-coups produce short-term political stability, they frequently undermine long-term institutional resilience.
Countries that experience them often face cycles of instability, weakened public trust, and recurring governance crises.
Conclusion
An autogolpe represents democracy turning against itself, a moment when a leader entrusted with power chooses to dismantle the very system that granted it.
While often justified as necessary or temporary, the concentration of unchecked authority carries profound risks.
Understanding how self-coups unfold and why they succeed is essential not only for policymakers and scholars, but for citizens everywhere.
Because the health of democracy ultimately depends on vigilance, institutional strength, and a shared commitment to constitutional order.
When power turns inward, the entire nation feels the impact.